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This paper analyzes the choice between flexible and designated manufacturing technologies
given that firms are allowed to determine how flexible the manufacturing system should be. We
allow firms to operate a mix of technologies, using a flexible system to serve some types of
consumer submarkets and a designated technology to serve others and allow firms to offer
multiple products even if they commit to the designated technology.  We show that for flexible
systems to be preferred they must offer strong economies of scope and must be capable of
producing, without significant cost penalties, customized products that are largely
indistinguishable from custom-built products.  By contrast, we show that an increase in
submarket size and an increase in the willingness of consumers to pay for particular types of
products encourages the use of designated technologies targeted at these submarkets.
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1. Introduction
Recent years have seen considerable advances in the development and diffusion of
flexible manufacturing systems.  "Flexibility" in this context refers to flexibility in product
design through which manufacturers can adapt a base product to individual consumer
requirements at very low additional unit costs: see, for example, Milgrom and Roberts (1990),
Mansfield (1993). Specifically, a flexible manufacturing system is defined as:
“a production unit capable of producing a range of discrete products with a minimum of
manual intervention” (US Office of Technology Assessment, 1984, p. 60)
Such flexible systems are employed in the manufacture of an increasingly wide range of
goods, from ceramic tiles to Levi jeans and custom shoes to data-warehousing.  It is now being
suggested that such flexibility will find a natural outlet as e-commerce continues to expand.  For
example, the New York Times recently stated:
  “What this means in practice is that rather than displaying the same set of pages to
every visitor, a Web site would present different information to each customer based on
the person’s data profile.” (New York Times, ‘Internet Companies Learn how to
Personalize Services’, August 28, 2000)
With the advent of flexible manufacturing systems, technology choice becomes an
important strategic issue.  The adoption of flexible manufacturing confers advantages that are
primarily based upon economies of scope but imposes penalties with respect to the additional set-
up costs that are necessary to establish such flexible systems: see, for example, Chang (1993),
Röller and Tombak (1990, 1993), Norman and Thisse (1999).  The existing literature that
attempts to address these strategic issues is limited in several respects.  In particular, two
important questions are not considered.
Given that a firm adopts a flexible manufacturing system
(i) how does it choose the range of products it should offer?
(ii) will a firm wish to operate a mix of flexible and designated technologies?
Question (i) is related to much of the recent literature on product variety in horizontally
differentiated industries and leads to another important question:
(iii) with endogenous technology choice will we see product agglomeration as, for example, is
discussed in Hamilton, Thisse and Weskamp (1989) and Anderson and Neven (1990)?                                                                                   Flexible versus Designated Technologies
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This paper attempts to shed some light on these questions. Strategic choice of technology
differentiation.  Applications of this approach to flexible manufacturing have been developed by
Eaton and Schmitt (1994) and Norman and Thisse (1999).  They build on the seminal ideas of
models of product differentiation.  MacLeod, Norman and Thisse (1988) show how this analogy
has the potential for being applied directly to the strategic analysis of flexible manufacturing:
customers’ specifications.  This means that the firm now produces a band
horizontally differentiated products … instead of a single product… Transport cost is no
longer interpreted as a utility loss, but as an additional cost incurred by the firm in
Almost all of the current literature on flexible manufacturing presents firms with a
relatively stark choice.  Choose between a flexible or a designated technology. If the designated
an important issue that is central to our analysis. We consider not just the choice between flexible
and designated manufacturing technologies but also the choice of just how flexible the
flexible system is capable of producing should be endogenous to the analysis, with firms trading
off increased width against the additional set-up costs that increased width imposes.1
This leads naturally to a second important element of our analysis.  We explicitly allow
firms to operate a   of technologies, using a flexible system to serve some types of consumer
and a designated technology to serve others.  Furthermore, we explicitly allow firms to offer
possibility that there will be asymmetry in technology choice in that  the strategic choice of
flexible systems by one firm will encourage another firm to adopt a different technology choice.
show that the attractiveness of flexible manufacturing is determined by the balance between the
economies of scope offered by flexible manufacturing and the economies of scale offered by                                                                                                   Flexible versus Designated Technologies
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designated technologies.  Secondly, the advantages of flexible systems are affected by consumer
tastes and the ability of flexible manufacturing systems to deliver, at low cost, customized
products that are truly substitutable for custom-built products.  Thirdly, we show that technology
choice is affected by market size and the willingness of consumers to pay for products of
particular types.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  In the next section we develop the
basic model, presenting the choice between designated and flexible technologies as a
simultaneous three-stage technology/location/quantity game.  Section 3 identifies the subgame
perfect Nash equilibria for this game.  Finally, we discuss the primary determinants of technology
choice in section 4.
2. The Model
The demand side is modeled as a variant of the familiar Hotelling (1929) and Salop
(1979) analysis in that we assume consumers to be distributed over a line market.  But we depart
from Hotelling (and the Eaton/Schmitt and Norman/Thisse analyses) in two ways.  First, we
assume that consumers are concentrated in five evenly spaced submarkets as in Figure 1.2  The
"distance" between submarkets is designated r (we give a more detailed interpretation of r
below).  Secondly, demand in each submarket is assumed to be identical and linear: inverse
demand in each consumer submarket is:
(1) pi = a - Qi/s (i = 1 - 5)
where s is a measure of submarket size.
On the production side we assume that the market is supplied by duopolists who can
choose from three technologies differentiated by their "width":
(i) a designated technology (d) with a width of 0 that can be used to serve at most one
consumer submarket;
(ii)  a partially flexible technology (p) with a width of 1 that can be used to serve a central
consumer submarket and at most one submarket on each side of this central submarket;
                                                                                                                                                            
1  Eaton and Schmitt (1994) do introduce this possibility in the initial specification of their model but drop
this cost term in their actual analysis.
2 The reason for our not assuming consumers to be uniformly distributed will become clearer below.  The
choice of five submarkets is not totally arbitrary.  It is large enough to allow consideration of the strategic issues in
which we are interested while being small enough to be analytically tractable.                                                                                                   Flexible versus Designated Technologies
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(iii) a flexible technology (f) with a width of 2 that can be used to serve a central consumer
submarket and at most two submarkets on each side of this central submarket.3
If a firm operates the d technology to supply some or all of the consumer submarkets the
location i of a particular d product is just the consumer submarket for which the product has been
designed.  For the p or f technologies, i defines the location of the base product on which the p or
f technology is centered.   We use the terminology "designated product i" to refer to the output of
a d technology located in consumer submarket i and "base product i" to refer to the consumer
submarket on which a p or f technology is centered.  Consumers in submarket i are assumed to
consider a designated product i or base product i produced by either of the duopolists to be
perfect substitutes.
Firms can choose to serve some or all consumer submarkets by establishing multiple
products.  Thus, for example, if technology d is chosen a firm can choose to establish up to five d
products, if technology p is chosen the firm can serve the remaining markets by establishing a
number of d products and if technology f is chosen the firm, if it has not located its base f
product in the central submarket (submarket 3 in Figure 1), can choose to serve the remaining
submarkets by establishing additional d or p products.  When we refer to technology choice t
below we mean the most flexible technology that a firm chooses.
(Figure 1 near here)
In specifying technology costs we distinguish between two types of variable costs.  First,
there are the variable costs of producing a particular designated or base product – costs of raw
materials, intermediate inputs, labor and so on – which can reasonably be assumed to be constant
across all three technologies.  Without loss of generality these costs are normalized to zero.
Secondly there are variable costs of customizing a base product centered in one consumer
submarket to the specific requirements of consumers in other submarkets.  We consider these
costs in more detail below.
In addition to variable costs, each technology is assumed to incur set-up costs.
Specifically, a technology of width w is assumed to incur set-up costs of F(w).   Clearly:
(2) F(0) < F(1) < F(2).
                                                
3 We do not consider technologies with widths greater than 2 given that we confine attention to a market
containing five submarkets.                                                                                                   Flexible versus Designated Technologies
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We assume that there are economies of scope as the width of the technology increases.  In
other words,
(3) F(w) < (2w + 1).F(0) for w = 1, 2.
In the analysis below it will prove convenient to assume that set-up costs increase with width
according to a relationship of the form:
(4) F(w) = (1+ w.k).F(0) (i = 0, 1 2)
where 2 > k > 0 is an inverse measure of the economies of scope of the flexible technologies.
We have already indicated that a d product can be sold only in the consumer submarket in
which it is located.  In the location theoretic interpretation of our model this is equivalent to
assuming that the cost of transporting a d product between adjacent consumer submarkets is at
least a per unit; in the horizontal product differentiation analogy it is equivalent to assuming that
consumers in submarket j consider designated product i to be worth at least a less than
designated or base product j.  By contrast, the cost of transporting a p or f product between
adjacent submarkets, or equivalently of customizing base product i to the consumer tastes of
submarket (i - 1) or (i + 1) is assumed to be r per unit.4
In the product differentiation analogy the parameter r can be thought of as a composite
producer and consumer measure of flexibility.  From the producer perspective, it seems
reasonable to assume that product redesign has some impact on variable costs even where
flexible manufacturing systems are introduced.   This impact increases the less truly flexible is
the flexible technology and the greater the degree of base product redesign that is necessary to
customize the base product to the preferences of another consumer submarket (the more
differentiated are consumer preferences between submarkets).  This element of r, in other words,
is a combined measure of production flexibility and consumers' preference diversity.
For consumers, r can be considered to contain a measure of the extent to which
consumers value customized products that are the output of flexible technologies less than
custom-built products, that are the output of designated technologies.5  In this latter respect, r is a
                                                
4 We do not feel that anything is to be gained from distinguishing p and f technologies with respect to r.
5 As an illustration we can consider flexible manufacturing in the production of elevators.  Clients are
typically offered a wide range of external finishes and car sizes -- the parts that users see -- but a much smaller range
of drive speeds and capacities, control systems and other components -- that the users do not see.  Custom-built
elevators, by contrast, offer a much wider range of specifications of the total system.                                                                                                   Flexible versus Designated Technologies
10/25/00 7
measure of the degree of substitutability between the products of adjacent flexible and designated
technologies.  Formally we assume:
(5) r r r v c = +
where:
w rv .  denotes the unit variable costs of redesigning a base product located in submarket i
to the desired characteristics of submarket (i - w) or (i + w); and
w.rc denotes the extent to which consumers in submarket (i - w) (or (i + w)) value a
product customized from base product i less than a designated or base product located in
(i - w) (or (i + w)).
This implies that if the price of designated (or base) product i is p(i) then the product customized
to submarket i from base product j will have to be offered at price  ( ) j i r i p c - -  and the net
revenue received by a firm from the sale of base product j customized to submarket i is
( ) ( ) ( ) j i r i p j i r r i p c v - - = - + -  per unit.
In characterizing equilibrium we assume that firms 1 and 2 aim to maximize aggregate
profit from sales to consumers in the five submarkets through their choices of technology,
locations (designs) of their products and outputs.  Formally, the technology-location-output game
is modeled as a three-stage duopoly game using the concept of subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium.
In the first stage firms simultaneously choose their technologies and establish a
technology configuration denoted t.  In the second stage subgame the firms choose the designs
(locations) of their base and/or designated products given the technology configuration
established in the first stage.  We refer to the outcome of this subgame as a market location
configuration, denoted l(t).  The third stage subgame is modeled as a Cournot game in which
each firm chooses how much to supply to each consumer submarket (and from which location to
supply) given the technology and market location configurations established in the first and
second stages.  That is, in the third stage subgame we identify the Cournot equilibrium for the
two firms in each technology and market location configuration.  This timing seems reasonable
in that it implies technology choice to be the most inflexible decision and output choice to be the
most flexible.                                                                                                   Flexible versus Designated Technologies
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3. Equilibrium Technology Choice
We assume that set-up costs are sufficiently low for each firm to be able to supply all
consumer submarkets no matter the technology configuration established in the first stage. A
sufficient condition for this is  ( ) 9 . 0
2 a s F £ .   We further assume that if a firm locates its base f
product at the market center it is able to supply all consumer submarkets no matter the
technology choices of its rival, which implies r < a/4.
3.1 Quantity Equilibrium
Consider any technology and market location configuration (t, l(t)).  Firm m supplies
consumer submarket i with its product in (t, l(t)) that offers the greatest net revenue per unit.  We
denote the location of this product  ( ) ( ) t l t,
m
i j *  and the associated quantity supplied to submarket i
by  ( ) ( ) t l t, i q
m
i* .  Standard analysis gives the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantity supplied to
submarket i by firm m as:








* - + - - = t l t, (m,n = 1,2, m „ n).
Price in submarket i is:




i * * - + - + = t l t,
and aggregate profit to firm m is:
(8)  ( ) ( )







r j i r j i a s
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where  ( ) t m F  is the aggregate set-up costs incurred by firm m in the technology and market
location configuration (t, l(t)).
Equation (8) indicates that the subgame perfect equilibrium in our technology-location-
output game is a function of five parameters F(0), k, a, s, and r.  We can, however, reduce this
parameter space to three by formulating the analysis in terms of the demand adjusted parameters:
(9) ( ) ( )
2 . ; a s F f a r = = r
in which case aggregate profit in (8) can be rewritten:
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(See Rowthorn (1992) for a similar approach in a different context.)  Note that our restrictions on
F(0) and r imply that f(0) < 1/9 and r < 1/4.
3.2 Location Equilibrium
By convention, and without loss of generality, we assume that firm 1 locates to the left of
firm 2 if the two firms have not chosen identical locations for their base products.  We denote by
Lm(t) the set of location configurations that can be chosen by firm m given the technology
configuration t.   A location configuration lm(t) ˛ Lm(t)  is a quintuplet:
(9)  lm(t) = ( )
5 4 3 2 1 , , , , m m m m m l l l l l (m = 1,2)





i = , , or  fm
i if firm m establishes a designated or base product in submarket i and
lm
i = 0 if firm m does not have a designated or base product in submarket i.
A market location configuration is a pair l(t) =  ( ) ( ) { } t l t l 2 1 , .
Identification of the Nash equilibrium of the location subgame requires that we consider a
number of different possible technology configurations.  In doing so we make the further
simplifying assumption that the d technology dominates the p technology if only two adjacent
submarkets are to be supplied and dominates the f technology if only three adjacent submarkets
are to be supplied: a sufficient condition for this to be the case is k > 1.6   This assumption has
three important implications in our model that considerably simplify the analysis. First, neither
firm will locate a p or f base product in the most peripheral consumer submarkets 1 and 5.
Secondly, neither firm will combine the f and p technologies.  Thirdly, neither firm will operate
two p technology plants.
The location subgame for any given technology configuration is analyzed on the
assumption that each firm chooses its location(s) to maximize profits given the location(s) of its
rival and the equilibrium quantity schedules identified in section 3.1.
3.2.1 t = {d,d}
Given our assumption that  ( ) 9 0
2 sa F £ , in the technology configuration {d,d} both firms
establish a designated product in every submarket.
                                                
6 If k > 1 then F(1) > 2.F(0) and F(2) > 3.F(0).   k > 1 is sufficient but not necessary since the p and f
technologies incur additional costs of r per unit in customizing a base product i to the requirements of adjacent
submarkets.                                                                                                   Flexible versus Designated Technologies
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Lemma 1:
The Nash equilibrium market location configuration for the technology configuration {d,d} is:
(10) ( ) ( )
5 4 3 2 1 , , , , } { m m m m m d d d d d =
* d d, lm (m = 1,2)         n
Profit to each firm is:










2 f a s m d d, (m = 1,2).
3.2.2 t = {p,p}
In analyzing location choice when both firms have chosen the partially flexible
technology we can confine our attention to cases in which firm 1 (2) locates its base p product in
consumer submarkets 2 or 3 (4 or 3).7  The pay-off matrix for the location subgame is given in
Table 1.
Lemma 2:
The Nash equilibrium market location configuration for the technology configuration {p,p} is:
(12)
{ } ( ) ( ) { } ( ) ( )

























, 0 , , 0 , ; , , 0 , , 0
0 , , 0 , , ; , 0 , , 0 ,
d p d d d p





p p, l p p, l
p p, l p p, l
2 1
2 1
with firms 1 and 2 locating their partially flexible base products in consumer submarkets
3 and 4 (or 2 and 3) respectively.8 n
Profit  { } ( ) p p,
* P m  to each firm is given by the off-diagonal entries in Table 1.
(Table 1 near here)
Lemma 2 indicates that agglomeration, or the principle of minimum differentiation, does
not apply when technology is a strategic variable and the technology chosen is not capable, by
itself, of supplying the entire market.   This is in sharp contrast to cases in which technology is
not a choice variable (Hamilton et al. (1989), Anderson and Neven (1990)).  The intuition
underlying this result can be seen by comparing, for example, the gross profits in each consumer



















2 , 0 , , 0 , d p d .  These are
given in Table 2.
                                                
7 Coincident location at (2,2) and (4,4) are equivalent to (3,3).
8 Note that these are equivalent equilibria.                                                                                                   Flexible versus Designated Technologies
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Aggregate output is identical for both firms in these two market location configurations
(recall equations (6) and (8)) but individual firm profit is determined by the distribution of
aggregate output.9  No matter the location configuration, firm 1 earns greatest profits from those
submarkets in which its product is custom-built rather than customized: submarkets 2, 4 and 5 in



















1 , , 0 , , 0 d d p  firm 1's
custom-built products are in competition with customized products of firm 2 whereas in the






1 , 0 , , 0 , d p d   they are in competition with custom-built products (with
the exception of submarket 5, of course).   The additional profits firm 1 earns in the former
location configuration from its custom-built products being in competition with customized
products more than offset the lower profits that result from its customized products being in
competition with custom-built products.10
(Table 2 near here)
3.2.3 t = {f,f}
In analyzing location choice when both firms have chosen the wider of the two flexible
technologies we can, as with the technology configuration {p,p}, confine our attention to cases in
which firm 1 (2) locates its base f product in consumer submarkets 2 or 3 (4 or 3).  The pay-off
matrix to the location subgame is given in Table 3.
Lemma 3:
The Nash equilibrium market location configuration for the technology configuration {f,f} is:
(i) ( ) ( ) 9 4 8 0
2 r - r £ f




1 , 0 , 0 , , 0 } { d f =
* f f, l1 ;  ( )=





with firms 1 and 2 locating their flexible base products in consumer submarkets  2 and 4
respectively.
(ii) ( ) ( ) ( ) 9 8 8 0 9 4 8
2 2 r + r £ < r - r f
                                                
9 Note that the four market location configurations of Table 1 have identical total set-up costs for each firm.
10 This is reminiscent of game theoretic models of foreign direct investment in which it is shown that the
relative profitability of different location configurations is determined by the balance between the import protection
effect of competing with imported products and the export cost effect of having to export a product to another
market: see Motta and Norman (1996).                                                                                                   Flexible versus Designated Technologies
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(13)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , , 0 , 0 , } { ; 0 , 0 , , 0 , 0 } {



















f f, l f f, l
f f, l f f, l
2 1
2 1
with firms 1 and 2 locating their flexible base products in consumer submarkets  2 and 3
(or 3 and 4) respectively.11
(iii) ( ) ( ) 0 9 8 8
2 f < r + r
(14) ( ) ( ) 0 , 0 , , 0 , 0 } {
3
1 f =
* f f, l1 ;  ( )=
* } { f f, l2 ( ) 0 , 0 , , 0 , 0
3
2 f
with firms 1 and 2 each locating their partially flexible base products in consumer
submarket 3.                  n
Profit  ( ) } { f f,
* P m  to each firm is given by the appropriate cell in Table 3.
Agglomeration is the Nash equilibrium to the location subgame with the technology
configuration {f,f} only for  ( ) ( ) 9 8 8 0
2 r + r > f .  The reasoning behind this result is
straightforward.  If the duopolists consider only the variable costs of production then the same
forces are at work as those discussed in section 3.2.2, leading to non-agglomeration of the base
products.  Table 3 indicates that, if set-up costs were ignored, the unique Nash equilibrium








2 f d }: recall that r < 1/4.
Once set-up costs are taken into account, however, there is an additional incentive for either firm
to wish to locate at the market center.  Central location offers savings in set-up costs.  The greater
is f(0) the more likely it is that these savings will offset the reduced gross profit that the
individual firm makes with more agglomerated locations.
(Table 3 near here)
3.2.4 t = {d,p} (or {p,d})
Our parameter restrictions imply that the only locations for the p base product that we
need to consider are in submarkets 2, 3 or 4.
Lemma 4:
The Nash equilibrium market location configuration for the technology configuration {d,p} is:
                                                
11 Note that these are equivalent equilibria.                                                                                                   Flexible versus Designated Technologies
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(15)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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p d, l p d, l
p d, l p d, l




with firm 2 indifferent between submarkets 2, 3 and 4 for the location of its partially
flexible base product.                     n
Profits in the technology configuration {d,p} are:12
(16)
( ) ( )







































3.2.5 t = {d,f} (or {f,d})
We need only consider the location of firm 2's f base product in submarkets 3 or 4.  Table
4 gives the profits to the two firms from each location choice by firm 2.
Lemma 5:
The Nash equilibrium market location configuration for the technology configuration {d,f} is:
(i) ( ) ( ) 9 16 8 0
2 r - r £ f










1 , , , , } { d d d d d =
* f d, l1 ;  ( )=





with firm 2 locating its f base product in submarket 4;
(ii) ( ) ( ) 9 16 8 0
2 r - r > f










1 , , , , } { d d d d d =
* f d, l1 ;  ( )=
* } { f d, l2 ( ) 0 , 0 , , 0 , 0
3
2 f
with firm 2 locating its f base product in submarket 3.         n
(Table 4 near here)
The market forces leading to Lemma 5 can be identified from Table 5; they are just those
discussed in 3.2.3.  If firm 2 chooses the location configuration ( ) 0 , 0 , , 0 , 0
3
2 f  rather than




2 f d  it gains some additional profit in the central consumer submarkets but loses profit
in the peripheral submarkets: in submarket 1 because it has replaced a designated product by a
customized product and in submarket 5 because the costs of customizing the base product have                                                                                                   Flexible versus Designated Technologies
10/25/00 14
been increased.  The resulting lower gross profits of central location are moderated by the lower
set-up costs firm 2 incurs and are more than offset if   ( ) ( ) 9 16 8 0
2 r - r > f .
(Table 5 near here)
3.2.6 t = {p,f} (or {f,p})
Our parameter constraints imply that firm 1 will operate a mix of p and d technologies,
locating its p base product at 2, 3 or 4, while firm 2 will operate a mix of f and d technologies,
with the f base product located at 3 or 4.  The pay-off matrix is given in Table 6.
Lemma 5:
The Nash equilibrium market location configuration for the technology configuration {p,f} is:
(i) ( ) ( ) 9 16 8 0
2 r - r £ f






1 , , 0 , , 0 } { d d p =
* f p, l1 ;  ( )=





with firm 2 locating its f base product in submarket 4 and firm 1 its p base product in
submarket 2;
(ii) ( ) ( ) 9 16 8 0
2 r - r > f
(20)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , 0 , , 0 , 0 } { ; 0 , , 0 , , } {
0 , 0 , , 0 , 0 } { ; , 0 , , 0 , } {

























f p d d
or f d p d







f p, l f p, l
f p, l f p, l




with firm 2 locating its f base product in submarket 3 and firm 1 indifferent between
locations 2, 3 and 4 for its p base product.         n
Once again, agglomeration is a Nash equilibrium only if set-up costs are "sufficiently
large".
(Table 6 near here)
3.3 Technology Equilibrium
In the first stage technology choice game each firm chooses its technology to maximize
profits given its rival's technology choice and given the equilibrium market location
configuration and quantity schedules that will be established in the second- and third-stage
subgames.
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Lemmas 1-5 indicate that there are five parameter regions to be examined.  The
technology choice pay-off matrices for each of these parameter regions are given in Appendix
Tables A1a-e.  Substituting from equation (4) leads to the following:
Proposition 1:
The three-stage perfect Nash equilibrium is:














i q  given by (10) and (6) respectively;


















i q  given by (12) and (6) respectively;













t* = {p,f} or {f,p}




i q  given by (20) and (6) respectively;













i q  given by (14) and (6) respectively.         n
The equilibria of Proposition 1 are illustrated in Figure 2 for the special case of k = 1.
(Figure 2 near here)
4. Discussion of the Determinants of Equilibrium Technology Choice
When competing firms can be multi-product firms no matter their technology choice, the
strategic advantages of flexible technologies would appear to be somewhat more limited than
previous analysis has suggested.  The explanation is straightforward.  In our analysis the firms
are not forced to adopt flexible manufacturing systems if they wish to supply more than one part
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of the market.  Rather, the choice of flexible manufacturing is determined by firms balancing the
savings in set-up costs these technologies offer against the variable costs of product
customization they impose.
The comparative static effects of changes in market parameters are also affected by our
multi-product setting.
From equation (4), the absolute difference in set-up costs between designated and flexible
technologies in supplying the same number of consumer submarkets increases with f(0).
Proposition 1 and Figure 2 indicate that flexible technologies are more likely to be used the
greater is f(0).  In other words, and as we would expect, flexible technologies are more likely to
be adopted the greater the absolute savings in set-up costs they offer.  It is also clear from
Proposition 1 and Figure 2 that the boundaries cn (n = 1,2,3) fall as k is reduced:




  (n = 1,2,3)
In other words,  the application of flexible manufacturing technologies is encouraged when these
technologies offer strong economies of scope relative to the economies of scale offered by
designated technologies.
A low value of r also leads to the more extensive adoption of flexible manufacturing.
This can arise for two reasons (equation (9)): low r or high a.   Consider the former.  (We shall
consider below how the demand parameter a affects the technology choice.)  Our discussion in
section 2 indicates that a low value of r can be attributed to one of three factors.  The first is if
the variable costs of redesigning a base product i to the desired characteristics of submarket j are
low, i.e. if there is a high degree of production flexibility.  Secondly, r is low if there is a low
degree of differentiation in consumer preferences between consumer submarkets i.e. a high
degree of substitutability between adjacent base products.  In either of these two cases the
producer costs (r i j v - ) of customizing base product i to the requirements of submarket j are
low.  Thirdly, r is lower the greater the extent to which consumers view customized products as
being close substitutes for custom-built products i.e. the greater the degree of substitutability
between the products of adjacent flexible and designated technologies (recall that this is
equivalent to rc  in (5) being "low").                                                                                                   Flexible versus Designated Technologies
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This is consistent with the available evidence on the diffusion of flexible manufacturing
systems.  These appear to be most prevalent in sectors where there is diversity in consumer
preferences and where the technology can react fairly accurately to particular consumer
requirements.  Ceramic tiles, shoes, automobiles and housing are obvious examples.  It also
suggests that e-commerce should encourage the spread of flexible systems by providing accurate
information on consumer tastes while at the same time offering relatively inexpensive
technologies that allow service providers to target these tastes accurately.
Now consider the effect of submarket size s.  Recall that f(0) = F(0)/s.a2 so that f(0) is a
decreasing function of submarket size.  It follows that an increase in submarket size reduces the
strategic incentive to adopt flexible manufacturing technologies.   This might at first sight appear
to be counter-intuitive and is certainly counter to results derived from alternative specifications
of flexible technology choice (see, for example, Röller and Tombak (op. cit.)).  The explanation
lies in the tension in our model between economies of scope and economies of scale. While only
the flexible technologies exhibit economies of scope, all three technologies exhibit economies of
scale.  Increased submarket size allows firms to take greater advantage of economies of scale no
matter their technology choice and reduces the demand-adjusted cost disadvantage of the
designated technology.  In other words, the larger are the individual consumer submarkets the
greater the incentive a firm has to design designated, or niche, products for these submarkets
rather than supply them with products that are customized versions of a base product targeted at
other submarkets.  When seen in this light, this outcome seems to accord well with our intuition.
Technology choice is affected in a similar manner by the consumer reservation price a.
Note from (9) that both f(0) and r are declining functions of  a.  In other words, an increase in the
consumer reservation price reduces the variable costs of production flexibility but also reduces
the set-up cost advantage of production flexibility.  The set-up cost effect is greater than the
variable cost effect with the result that an increase in the consumer reservation price reduces the
strategic incentive to adopt flexible manufacturing techniques.  Simply put, a greater (lesser)
willingness on the part of consumers to pay for products designed to their specific requirements
encourages the adoption of designated (flexible) technologies.
This points to an offsetting influence that will tend to limit the diffusion of flexible
manufacturing.  As incomes rise consumers can be expected to be willing to pay more for                                                                                                   Flexible versus Designated Technologies
10/25/00 18
products designed to their specific tastes, encouraging firms to adopt technologies that are well
adapted to satisfying niche markets.  This is, presumably, one of the reasons why highly
specialized fashion houses such as Dior and Escada are able to thrive in high-income markets
while more flexible companies such as Wal-Mart thrive in lower income environments.
5. Conclusions
Flexible manufacturing systems capable of customizing products to the tastes of
heterogeneous consumers are generally regarded as being superior to technologies that are
capable only of producing designated or niche products.  If that is so then we should expect over
time that flexible technologies will drive out inflexible ones.
There are, however, reasons for questioning this apparently appealing conclusion.  In
earlier work Norman and Thisse (1999) argue that flexible manufacturing leads to a more
competitive pricing regime with the result that adoption of such technologies might actually
reduce profitability.  Our analysis in this paper suggests other reasons for skepticism regarding
the evolutionary dominance of flexible systems.  We have argued that the analysis of competing
technologies should allow for the possibility that firms offer multiple products, are able to choose
the degree of flexibility of any flexible system that they employ, and are able to deploy a mix of
technologies.
This leads to a rather more complex set of trade-offs.  It remains the case that flexible
technologies are preferred when they offer strong economies of scope relative to the economies
of scale available from designated technologies and when the customized products of flexible
technologies can be made practically indistinguishable from custom-built products at very little
cost penalty.  On the other hand, we have shown that flexible technologies are not necessarily
preferred when consumers differ widely in their preferences.  In such circumstances it may well
be better for the firm to offer multiple designated products, each targeted at a particular part of
the taste spectrum.
By a similar argument, our analysis suggests that as particular parts of the consumer taste
spectrum grow in size and as consumer incomes rise it may be better for firms to produce niche
products designed specifically for particular submarkets rather than try to serve these markets by
using flexible manufacturing to customize a base product centered in another submarket.  In
other words, we would argue that the likely future scenario is likely to exhibit a high degree of                                                                                                   Flexible versus Designated Technologies
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heterogeneity in the technologies that firms employ,  with firms will operate a range of
technologies of varying degrees of flexibility determined by the precise characteristics of the
markets they are trying to capture and the ability of the flexible technology accurately to target
particular consumer requirements.                                                                                                   Flexible versus Designated Technologies
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Figure 1: The Market
r r
Figure 2: Three-stage Perfect Nash Equilibrium -- k = 1.
Notes:
c1 :  ( ) ( ) ( ) k f - r - r = 2 9 8 8 0
2 ; c2 :  ( ) ( ) ( ) k f - r - r = 2 9 24 16 0
2 ;
c3 :  ( ) ( ) k f - r = 2 9 16 0 ; b1 :  ( ) ( ) 9 16 8 0
2 r - r = f ;
b2 :  ( ) ( ) 9 12 8 0
2 r - r = f ; b3 :  ( ) ( ) 9 4 8 0
2 r - r = f ;
b4 :  ( ) ( ) 9 8 8 0
2 r + r = f .                                                                                                   Flexible versus Designated Technologies
10/25/00 22
Table 1:  Pay-Off Matrix for {p,p} Technology Configuration
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Table 3:  Pay-Off Matrix for {f,f} Technology Configuration
Firm 1
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Table 5: Gross Profits to Firm 2 with Technology Choice {d,f}
Consumer Location Configuration
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Table 6:  Pay-Off Matrix for {p,f} Technology Configuration
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Table A1a: Technology Choice Pay-Off Matrix - ( ) ( ) 9 16 8 0




1:  5s.a2(1/9 - f(0))
2:  5s.a2(1/9 - f(0))
1: s.a2((5-8r+8r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
2: s.a2((5+4r+2r2)/9
               - 5f(0))
1: s.a2((5-16r+24r2)/9
               - f(0) - f(2))
2: s.a2((5+8r+6r2)/9
               - 5f(0))
Firm 2 p
1: s.a2((5+4r+2r2)/9
               - 5f(0))
2: s.a2((5-8r+8r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
1: s.a2((5-4r+10r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
2: s.a2((5-4r+10r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
1: s.a2((5-12r+22r2)/9
               - f(0) - f(2))
2: s.a2((5+10r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
f
1: s.a2((5+8r+6r2)/9
               - 5f(0))
2: s.a2((5-16r+24r2)/9
               - f(0) - f(2))
1:  s.a2((5+10r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
2:  s.a2((5-12r+22r2)/9
               - f(0) - f(2))
1: s.a2((5-8r+26r2)/9
               - f(0) - f(2))
2: s.a2((5-8r+26r2)/9
               - f(0) - f(2))
Table A1b: Technology Choice Pay-Off Matrix -( ) ( ) ( ) 9 12 8 0 9 16 8




1:  5s.a2(1/9 - f(0))
2:  5s.a2(1/9 - f(0))
1: s.a2((5-8r+8r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
2: s.a2((5+4r+2r2)/9
               - 5f(0))
1: s.a2((5-24r+40r2)/9
               - f(0) - f(2))
2: s.a2((5+12r+10r2)/9
               - 5f(0))
Firm 2 p
1: s.a2((5+4r+2r2)/9
               - 5f(0))
2: s.a2((5-8r+8r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
1: s.a2((5-4r+10r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
2: s.a2((5-4r+10r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
1: s.a2((5-12r+22r2)/9
               - f(0) - f(2))
2: s.a2((5+10r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
f
1: s.a2((5+12r+10r2)/9
               - 5f(0))
2: s.a2((5-24r+40r2)/9
               - f(0) - f(2))
1:  s.a2((5+10r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
2:  s.a2((5-12r+22r2)/9
               - f(0) - f(2))
1: s.a2((5-8r+26r2)/9
               - f(0) - f(2))
2: s.a2((5-8r+26r2)/9
               - f(0) - f(2))                                                                                                   Flexible versus Designated Technologies
10/25/00 26
Table A1c: Technology Choice Pay-Off Matrix - ( ) ( ) ( ) 9 4 8 0 9 12 8




1:  5s.a2(1/9 - f(0))
2:  5s.a2(1/9 - f(0))
1: s.a2((5-8r+8r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
2: s.a2((5+4r+2r2)/9
               - 5f(0))
1: s.a2((5-24r+40r2)/9
               - f(0) - f(2))
2: s.a2((5+12r+10r2)/9
               - 5f(0))
Firm 2 p
1: s.a2((5+4r+2r2)/9
               - 5f(0))
2: s.a2((5-8r+8r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
1: s.a2((5-4r+10r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
2: s.a2((5-4r+10r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
1: s.a2((5-20r+34r2)/9
               - f(2))
2: s.a2((5+4r+10r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
f
1: s.a2((5+12r+10r2)/9
               - 5f(0))
2: s.a2((5-24r+40r2)/9
               - f(0) - f(2))
1:  s.a2((5+4r+10r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
2:  s.a2((5-20r+34r2)/9
               - f(2))
1: s.a2((5-8r+26r2)/9
               - f(0) - f(2))
2: s.a2((5-8r+26r2)/9
               - f(0) - f(2))
Table A1d: Technology Choice Pay-Off Matrix - ( ) ( ) ( ) 9 8 8 0 9 4 8




1:  5s.a2(1/9 - f(0))
2:  5s.a2(1/9 - f(0))
1: s.a2((5-8r+8r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
2: s.a2((5+4r+2r2)/9
               - 5f(0))
1: s.a2((5-24r+40r2)/9
               - f(0) - f(2))
2: s.a2((5+12r+10r2)/9
               - 5f(0))
Firm 2 p
1: s.a2((5+4r+2r2)/9
               - 5f(0))
2: s.a2((5-8r+8r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
1: s.a2((5-4r+10r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
2: s.a2((5-4r+10r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
1: s.a2((5-20r+34r2)/9
               - f(2))
2: s.a2((5+4r+10r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
f
1: s.a2((5+12r+10r2)/9
               - 5f(0))
2: s.a2((5-24r+40r2)/9
               - f(0) - f(2))
1:  s.a2((5+4r+10r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
2:  s.a2((5-20r+34r2)/9
               - f(2))
1: s.a2((5-16r+30r2)/9
               - f(2))
2: s.a2((5-4r+18r2)/9
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Table A1e: Technology Choice Pay-Off Matrix - ( ) ( ) 0 9 8 8




1:  5s.a2(1/9 - f(0))
2:  5s.a2(1/9 - f(0))
1: s.a2((5-8r+8r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
2: s.a2((5+4r+2r2)/9
               - 5f(0))
1: s.a2((5-24r+40r2)/9
               - f(0) - f(2))
2: s.a2((5+12r+10r2)/9
               - 5f(0))
Firm 2 p
1: s.a2((5+4r+2r2)/9
               - 5f(0))
2: s.a2((5-8r+8r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
1: s.a2((5-4r+10r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
2: s.a2((5-4r+10r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
1: s.a2((5-20r+34r2)/9
               - f(2))
2: s.a2((5+4r+10r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
f
1: s.a2((5+12r+10r2)/9
               - 5f(0))
2: s.a2((5-24r+40r2)/9
               - f(0) - f(2))
1:  s.a2((5+4r+10r2)/9
               - 2f(0) - f(1))
2:  s.a2((5-20r+34r2)/9
               - f(2))
1: s.a2((5-12r+10r2)/9
               - f(2))
2: s.a2((5-12r+10r2)/9
               - f(2))TUFTS UNIVERSITY
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